abstract: This article synthesizes several different studies of Hegel's and Nietzsche's expressive conceptions of action and agency and identifies a related account in Deleuze's Logic of Sense. It argues that such conceptions not only challenge familiar voluntarist accounts of action and agency; they also demand a reassessment of standard approaches to the relation between norms and action. For the voluntarist, an agent's action is caused by the separate, prior intention of the agent. For expressivists, an agent's intention is inseparable from the action expressing it and nonisolatable from the expression of this intention-action in interpretative activity. For the voluntarist, the norms governing action can be thought of as more or less freestanding, entering into the prior formation of the agent's intention. For the expressivist, the norm or principle on which an agent acts will be produced over time, through the unfolding of the action expressing it, as well as through interpretative struggle over the meaning of that action, all of which takes place in a social space governed by more basic norms concerning the offering of actdescriptions, recognition, and social and hermeneutical struggle. A number of important differences among Hegel's, Nietzsche's, and Deleuze's accounts are identified, and their significance is explored.
From Voluntarism to Expressivism: The Question of Normativity
In relation to the field of individual action in general, normativity is standardly understood in terms of "oughtness." More precisely, norms are conceived as making claims upon how we ought to act. As Christine Korsgaard puts it in her landmark work, The Sources of Normativity, norms command, oblige, guide, or recommend certain actions. Morality, to put it crudely, consists in that list of things that one really ought to do. And the normative question is the question of what justifies the claims that norms or morals make on us to perform certain actions and refrain from others. 1 A number of different answers can be given to this question about the "sources of normativity," but I will not canvass them here.
2 What I will do instead is challenge the terms in which the normative question has been set up. Indeed, this way of thinking about morals and norms and their relation to action presupposes a certain conception of action and agency, namely, a voluntarist conception. On this conception, there are two separate elements of action-a physical movement and a mental state such as an intention-and this mental state temporally precedes and causes the physical movement. Now, it is only with this distinction in hand that normativity is typically discussed. Indeed, in order to be guiding or obliging, already determinate morals or norms are supposed to enter the scene at the level of the formation of the agent's intention-the intention that will in turn be the cause of the act. 3 With reference to formation of the prior intention, the attendant action can then be evaluated: an action will be "good" insofar as the mental state that causes the physical movement is appropriately constituted in relation to the relevant norms. And as part of this evaluation, we ask what justifies the claims these norms made on the agent to perform this action.
But in fact, what this account hinges on-namely, the voluntarist conception of action and agency-has been challenged by thinkers such as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Deleuze, all of whom, in various places, defend an expressive conception of action and agency. Instead of taking intentions as primary in the explanation of action, these thinkers take actions to be primary in the explanation of the intentions that animate them, and at two levels: first, for these thinkers, intentions are ontologically inseparable from the unfolding of the actions that express them; and second, the "sense" of these intentions-actions is nonisolatable from how they are expressed in interpretative or sense-making activity. As Robert Pippin usefully formulates it, for expressivists such as Hegel and Nietzsche (and, I would add, Deleuze), agents are not behind their actions, as they are on the voluntarist account. Agents are, rather, "out there" in the actions that express their intentions, and the actions themselves are "out there" as well: expressed in their multiple interpretations. 4 But now, when we take actions to be primary in relation to the mental states that animate them, what can be said about the relation between norms and individual action? Does normativity still come into the picture? It does, but not primarily at the level of the prior formation of an intention that subsequently causes an action. Normativity, rather, enters the picture at three related levels. First, normativity enters the picture at the level of "act-descriptions," that is, insofar as there are normative, sociohistorical constraints as to what could count as a correct or appropriate act-description in a given context. Second, normativity enters the picture at the level of the "success conditions" for an action. Whereas on the voluntarist conception an action is successful if the agent's prior intention has been fulfilled, on the expressive conception a successful action is a "normative status" that depends on the agent recognizing herself, and being recognized by others, as responsible for an act falling under an agreed-upon description. Finally, normativity enters the picture at the level of how one ought to respond to conflicting act-descriptions. The picture of normativity that emerges here thus contrasts markedly with the voluntarist's understanding of it. Indeed, whereas on a voluntarist conception, determinate, pregiven norms enter into the formation of an agent's intention prior to that agent's action, on the expressive conception, the norm or principle that an agent will be held to have been intentionally acting on will be produced over time, through the unfolding of the action that expresses it, as well as through struggle over the description or "sense" of that action.
In what follows, I would first like to explore how Hegel and Nietzsche can be understood to be critics of voluntarist conceptions of agency and defenders of expressive conceptions of agency. As part of this, I will explain how intentions-actions are themselves "normative statuses" that rely on normative attitudes regarding what counts as an appropriate actdescription, the success conditions of an action, and how inevitable conflict between act-descriptions ought to be dealt with. I will then explore Deleuze's approach to these issues in his The Logic of Sense.
5 In relation to this task, the previous analyses of contemporary work on Hegel and Nietzsche can be thought of as functioning in three ways. First, they will have motivated the idea that expressive approaches to action and agency belong to an established tradition, of which Deleuze's Logic of Sense is arguably a part. Second, the earlier analyses will have brought to light the two major theses of expressive agency-the "inseparability" and "nonisolatability" theses, indicated above. 6 These two theses can then be shown to be present in Deleuze's Logic of Sense. Finally, the studies of Hegel and Nietzsche will have brought to light the three respects in which normativity relates to expressive conceptions of agency: at the level of the appropriateness of act-descriptions, at the level of success conditions for actions, and at the level of what ought to be done about conflicting act-descriptions. And again, these three levels of normativity can be shown to be present in The Logic of Sense. By way of conclusion, I will argue that Nietzsche's and Deleuze's positions differ in one significant respect from Hegel's, namely, with respect to the norms governing how one ought to respond to conflicting act-descriptions. Finally, I will make some brief remarks about Deleuze's approach to ethics in The Logic of Sense and how this differs from a morality-based approach to ethics that presupposes a voluntarist conception of action and agency.
Hegel: Making Oneself a Reality Through Action
Charles Taylor begins an influential essay on Hegel's philosophy of action by asking what distinguishes human action from other kinds of events.
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The answer, as traditionally conceived, is the category of intentions: actions are the intentional doings of agents, and this is what makes them distinct from mere physical happenings. There are, however, two different ways of conceiving of the relationship between actions and intentions: a "causal" or "voluntarist" conception and a "qualitative" or "expressive" conception of the kind defended by Hegel. According to Taylor, voluntarists distinguish two elements of action-a physical movement and a psychological state such as an intention-and in such a way that the intention temporally precedes and causes the physical movement. The qualitative or expressive conception, by contrast, understands actions as "inhabited by the purposes which direct them, so that action and purpose are ontologically inseparable."
8 On this latter view, since intentions cannot be understood as separate from the actions they animate, they cannot be said to cause them in any metaphysically interesting way.
Taylor explains that, for Hegel, mental states such as intentions are not mere givens to which the agent in question has privileged access. Rather, intentions must be understood fundamentally through the category of action, and on two levels. On one level, our intentions are the reflections of the goals of an active life process, namely, the activity of Spirit that we, in our doings, embody in various partial ways. At first, however, the goals of this life process are poorly understood or formulated. On a second level, then, the inner reflection of the life process is transformed by our activity of trying to adequately formulate, in an appropriate "expressive medium," what it is we are doing. An agent's awareness of what it is he is "really" doing is thus not a given but something to be achieved: a mental form that is generated entirely from action as the reflective understanding of what it is he is doing. And this achievement would ultimately culminate in the agent clearly seeing what Spirit is doing through him or seeing the identity of the world activity with his own.
9 As Taylor writes:
We have two related activities. There is a fundamental activity of Spirit, which it tries to grasp through the various levels of self-formulation. These two mutually conditioning activities are at first out of phase but are destined in the end to coincide perfectly. That is because it will come clear at the end that the goal of the whole life process was that Spirit come to understand itself, and at the same time the life process itself will be entirely transparent as an embodiment of this purpose. But this perfect coincidence only comes at the end. And it only comes through the overcoming of noncoincidence, where what the pattern of activity is differs from what this pattern says.
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Taylor's explication of Hegel's qualitative account of intentions-actions thus gives us a conception of "expressive agency" resting on two theses: an inseparability thesis and a nonisolatability thesis. On the one hand, Taylor's Hegel affirms the ontological inseparability of intentions and action at two levels: effective action and expressive action. On the other hand, he affirms the nonisolatability of an agent's intention-action from the "expressive medium" through which it is understood-a medium composed of concepts and symbols, as well as historically situated cultural institutions and practices.
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Robert Pippin also endorses an expressive understanding of Hegel's conception of agency. Like Taylor, Pippin understands Hegel to have rejected the voluntarist approach to action and to have, rather, affirmed an expressive account of action and agency along with what I have called the inseparability and nonisolatability theses with regard to intentions-actions. However, he wants to rid Hegel of the metaphysically heavy baggage that Taylor attributes to him, namely, the theory of "Cosmic Spirit," which conceives human action merely as the vehicle for Spirit's progress to full selfconsciousness. 12 In contrast to Taylor's emphasis on the underlying role of Spirit, Pippin primarily speaks of the sociality of action: the way in which an agent's self-relation-that is, her take on what she is doing and whyis mediated by her relation to others. 13 In other words, for Pippin, Hegel understands one's self-description of one's action, along with one's selfascription of one's intention, as being subject to a form of social negotiation or mediation.
Pippin writes that, in the second half of chapter 5 of the Jena Phenomenology, Hegel maintains that it is a mistake to separate the inner intention from the outer action and to explain action with reference to the isolated separate intention as prior cause.
14 In other words, Hegel understands intentions to be inseparable from the actions that express them, which implies that, even for the agent, intentions can only be determined retrospectively once the deed has actually been performed. As Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology of Spirit, "An individual cannot know what he [really] is until he has made himself a reality through action." 15 Or again: "Ethical self-consciousness now learns from its deed the developed nature of what it actually did." 16 But Pippin also argues that this thesis about the inseparability of the intention and the action goes hand in hand with what I have called the nonisolatability thesis. The idea here is that, if the intention is inseparable from the deed that expresses it, and so if the agent has no privileged authority with respect to the nature of his deed simply by virtue of being "behind" the deed in a causal sense, then the deed is inevitably open to contestation within the agent's social community. As Pippin argues, "My intention is thus doubly 'real': it is out there 'in' the deed, and the deed is essentially out there 'for others.'" 17 Or again, as Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology, the "action is thus only the translation of its individual content into the objective element, in which it is universal and recognized, and it is just the fact that it is recognized that makes the deed a reality." 18 But now, it follows from this that an agent would not be able to unproblematically understand herself to be performing a particular action if her community did not receive it in much the same way. Moreover, the agent would not have executed her intention successfully if her community did not ascribe to her both the act-description and the intention she ascribed to herself. 19 Pippin gives the following helpful illustration of this idea:
You may intend to signal in a meeting that you wish to speak and so raise your hand. But if in that society, raising one's hand expresses that one is communing with one's ancestors and wishes to be left alone, then you did not signal anything and so cannot be said to have realized the intention of signaling. (If an intention is a subjective resolution that can be manifested in a deed, then you cannot successfully intend what cannot be expressed in a deed in that context, although you can imagine what it would be to realize such an expression and in a self-deluded fantasy take yourself to have done so . . .). 20 So, following Pippin, there are for Hegel sociohistorical, normative constraints as to what could count as a correct or appropriate act-description. What is more, a successful action is itself a normative status that depends on the agent recognizing himself, and being recognized by his community, as being "in" an action falling under an agreed-upon actdescription. But we should also note here that, for Pippin, Hegel does not simply dissolve the agent's "inner" intention into its "outer" expression. He points to the Moralität section of the Philosophy of Right and Hegel's insistence on the "right of intention" and "right of knowledge," that is, the right to have attributed to one only those deeds that one intended and whose consequences one could have foreseen. 21 In other words, if unforeseeable contingencies intervene during the unfolding of my action, and in such a way that what actually happens diverges wildly from what I intended and could reasonably have foreseen, Hegel would not claim that this external event manifests what I truly intended. Indeed, in this section, Hegel argues that Oedipus taking personal responsibility for his unwitting parricide and incest is mistaken and is primarily due to the legal codes of antiquity not attaching enough importance to the dimension of moral subjectivity. In such cases, Hegel thinks, we ought to distinguish between a mere deed and an action proper: between Tat (something that happened because of me) and Handlung (a eed that can be attributed to me). Nevertheless, following Pippin, despite his insistence on the importance of the rights of intention and knowledge in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel would still maintain This brings us to a third contemporary philosopher who has attributed to Hegel an expressive conception of agency: Robert Brandom, and in particular in his as-yet-unpublished A Spirit of Trust. 23 Brandom is much closer to Pippin than to Taylor, in that he, like Pippin, emphasizes the social dimension of action and agency. But what is of particular interest for our purposes here is that Brandom gives us a very interesting account of the way in which, in Hegel, the difference between first-and third-person perspectives on intentions-actions is mediated by a community structured by reciprocal confession and forgiveness.
In parts 4 and 5 of A Spirit of Trust, Brandom proposes that we understand Hegel as saying that one and the same action can fall under different descriptions corresponding to the agent's perspective on her action and the community's perspective on that action. The content of an action, then, will be what is both acknowledged by the agent and attributed by the community, which is to say, a product of a process of reciprocal recognition.
In order to explain how two divergent perspectives on one content can be synthesized, Brandom initially appeals to Frege's distinction between sense and reference. Following this distinction, the action "in-itself," the referent, must be distinguished from its different senses, that is, from what it is for the agent as well as what it is for the community. The action in-itself can then be conceived as the normative product of the recognitive mediation of these different perspectives, that is to say, whereby the different senses appear as semantically determining and cognitively presenting the action in-itself, but only insofar as these senses are able to form part of a story or "recollection" (in Hegel's sense), told by both the agent and the community, in which these different senses feature as better or worse attempts to present the action in-itself.
The second step in Brandom's argument is to suggest that, in the concluding eleven paragraphs of the Phenomenology's "Spirit" chapter, Hegel sketches how we can understand the different perspectives on action-the agent's and the community's-to be mediated through reciprocal confession and forgiveness. Confession, on Brandom's interpretation, involves acknowledging a disparity between sense and reference. In other words, both the agent and the community must confess the particularity and contingency of their attitudes and acknowledge that what the action is for them, subjectively, is not what the action objectively is in-itself, that is to say, apart from any particular subjective perspective. In Brandom's terms, mutual confession means that the agent and his community treat their intentions and beliefs as normative statuses, which is to say, as commitments to which they are entitled only insofar as these are acknowledged by one's peers as standing in legitimate inferential relations with other accepted intentions and beliefs within an intersubjective "space of reasons."
But as well as confession, what is required is forgiveness. On Brandom's interpretation, forgiving overcomes the confessed disparity between what the action is for the agent and for the community and what the action is in-itself, apart from these subjective perspectives. Forgiving, then, is the "recollective" labor of finding a concept for the action-a concept that is being expressed more or less well by the subjective conceptions endorsed by the agent and her community. In other words, the task of forgiving is to reveal the confessed disparity between sense and reference as a retrospectively necessary phase of a process of more adequately expressing what the action is in-itself. Through mutual confession and forgiveness, then, both the agent and the community acknowledge that what recollectively shows up as the action in-itself is a normative status that has authority over their merely subjective perspectives on it.
What we can now conclude from Taylor's, Pippin's, and Brandom's expressive accounts of Hegel's philosophy of action is that normative considerations do not primarily and straightforwardly enter upon the scene at the level of the formation of the agent's intention-the intention that subsequently causes an action. Rather, given the inseparability and nonisolatability theses with regard to intentions-actions, we must say that normativity enters the picture at three related levels: (a) at the level of act-descriptions, because there are normative constraints inherent in particular sociohistorical formations as to what can count as an appropriate act-description; (b) at the level of what counts as a successful action, because a successful action is a "normative status" that depends on the agent recognizing himself, and being recognized by others, as responsible for the act falling under a particular act-description; and (c) at the level of how we ought to respond to conflicting act-descriptions-for Hegel, in cases where there are conflicting act-descriptions, a process of mutual confession and forgiveness is called for. In short, then, for Hegel, the norm or principle an agent will be held to have been acting on is not given in advance, entering into the formation of the agent's intention in a determinate way prior to the act. The norm or principle on which an agent acts will, rather, be produced over time through the unfolding of the action that expresses it, as well as through the eventual resolution of interpretative struggle over the meaning of that action, all of which takes place in an intersubjective space governed by norms of communication, reciprocal recognition, and "confession and forgiveness."
Nietzsche: "The Deed Is Everything"
Pippin has also recently put forward a particularly interesting, Hegel-inspired analysis of Nietzsche's famous claim about agency in the first essay of Genealogy of Morality ( §13), namely, that there is no "doer" behind the deed and that "the deed is everything." 24 Pippin stresses in particular that while Nietzsche here is clearly repudiating the slavish, metaphysical, and Christian conception of "free will," this particular passage does not license us to take the route often traveled in Nietzsche scholarship, which consists in interpreting Nietzsche as wanting to naturalize all talk of motives, goals, intentions, and so on. One version of this interpretation understands Nietzsche to deny that the subject is free in a metaphysically strong sense to choose to do one thing over another and to, rather, claim that the causal determinants of action are to be sought in various physiological and psychological facts about individuals or types of individuals. 25 But the problem with this interpretation is that even if we substitute material substances and corporeal states for an immaterial soul, we are still positing-and in opposition to Nietzsche's explicit thesis-a "doer" who is located causally behind the deed. Another line of Nietzsche interpretation understands Nietzsche to explain "what happens" as the manifestation of underlying and interconnected forces. But again, following Pippin, this will not help us break out of the causal, "doer behind the deed" model of action. For either we must say that the forces themselves cause what happens, or we must have reference to persisting substances or subjects in which these forces and the relations between them inhere as the determinants of action. Either way, we will still have reference to a causal instance before or behind the deed. As Nietzsche puts it in this same passage in the Genealogy, "The scientists do no better [than the Christians] when they say 'force moves, force causes' and such like,-all our science . . . has not rid itself of the changelings foisted upon it, the 'subjects.'" 26 So Nietzsche rejects the causal conception of agency in both its metaphysical and naturalistic forms. Pippin notes, however, that Nietzsche remains committed to a traditional conception of act-descriptions, whereby an "act is individuated as an act mainly by reference to the agent's intentions."
27 Indeed, the Genealogy itself is clearly a story about social struggle between human agents-slaves, masters, priests, and so on-to whom Nietzsche attributes complex sets of unconscious motivations for what they do (ressentiment, feelings of powerlessness, will to mastery, will to nothingness, etc.). So the question becomes: How can we reconcile the idea that what individuates action is the intention of the agent with the idea that there is no "doer" behind the deed in a causal sense? Pippin's response is to read Nietzsche as offering, and along similar lines to Hegel, an "expressive" account of agency-which is to say, an account of agency that does not deny that there is a subject of the deed but asserts that the agent is not so much behind the deed as in the deed that expresses her agency.
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Following Pippin, the Nietzschean expressive account of agency is characterized by the two broad theses about agency identified in Hegel: the "inseparability" thesis and the "nonisolatability" thesis. The inseparability thesis, as has been seen, holds that the agent is not separate from his deed. In other words, the agent, with his intention, does not stand behind the deed as a separately identifiable element of action, such that the prior intention causes the action. Rather, an agent's intentions (and inner life more generally) cannot be grasped independently of what he effectively does. In fact, for Nietzsche, it appears that this understanding of agency is part and parcel of the warrior-noble's understanding of his agency, since for him one simply is what one does. And it is in this way that Pippin analyzes Nietzsche's infamous claim in the Genealogy I.13 that the strength of the "bird of prey" cannot not "express itself" as strength: an agent cannot be said to have "inner" strength or resolve in any meaningful sense independently of the "outer" expression of strength or resolve. 29 Furthermore, the inseparability thesis is visible in Nietzsche's description of the "sovereign individual" in the second essay of Genealogy ( §2). As David Owen and Aaron Ridley have convincingly argued, the sovereign individual's "prerogative to promise" is derived from the way in which he unfailingly carries out his commitments in concrete actions regardless of changing circumstances (or as Nietzsche puts it, "even 'in the face of fate'"). 30 As Pippin summarizes the core idea, the "deed alone can show one who one is, what one is actually committed to. . . . [W] hat I end up with, what I actually did, is all that can count fully as my intention realized or expressed." 31 The nonisolatability thesis, in turn, holds that the content of an agent's intention cannot be determined in isolation from a larger complex of social, historical, and linguistic factors. Hegel, of course, argued that an agent's intentions cannot be made sense of in isolation from certain historically contingent social conditions. But Nietzsche also appears to affirm a view of this kind. Indeed, Nietzsche treats the unequal distribution of social power (between the nobility and the slaves) as an essential element in understanding the action broadly described as the "slave revolt in morality." 32 Nietzsche also argues that, at different points in history, the rise to power of various social classes (warrior, priestly, etc.) coincided with the imposition of these classes' evaluations and interpretations of actions and agents. We can think here of the etymological evidence Nietzsche presents for the historical passage from evaluations made in terms of "good and bad" and their analogues to evaluations in terms of "good and evil" and their analogues. 33 We can also think of Nietzsche's discussion in the second essay of the Genealogy of the various historical interpretations and reinterpretations of the "purpose of punishment." 34 Such analyses confirm the idea that, for Nietzsche, an understanding of the intentions-actions of agents cannot not be isolated from wider social and hermeneutical struggle. 35 So this is what Nietzsche's expressive understanding of agency amounts to for Pippin: the subject is not behind the deed, but neither is the subject "absent." Rather, the subject "is 'out there' in his deeds, but the deeds are 'out there' too, multiply interpretable, and that means, in Nietzsche's understanding, that they can be in multiple ways 'appropriated' by others. These interpretations are themselves already expressions of various types that cannot be isolated from historical time and from the contestations of their own age." 36 In support of the presence of this expressive account of agency in Nietzsche's work more broadly, Pippin also cites the following passage from Thus Spoke Zarathustra: "I wish your self were in the deed like the mother is in the child." 37 For Pippin, what this image suggests is that a mother both "sees" herself in the child and yet acknowledges the child's independence as a person in her own right, suggesting that once we "launch" a deed, it takes on a life of its own in the world . . . , taken up by others in ways we could not have anticipated, perhaps manifesting aspects of our character that we would not have anticipated. The image further deflates any notion of a strict individual ownership of the deed, even as it proposes another sort of attachment to our deeds as somehow still "our own" even if independent of us and from any individual causal agency. 38 This sounds remarkably like Hegel's expressive understanding of agency. However, Pippin notes that there remain some significant differences between Hegel's and Nietzsche's conceptions. In particular, Nietzsche in no way defends the normative demand for different perspectives on action to be overcome through reciprocal confession and forgiveness. Indeed, as Pippin puts it, for Nietzsche "there is no best, appropriate, finally reconciling resolution to these sorts of conflicts [over the nature of actions]. 'There is' only the conflict." 39 Of course, this is not to say that Nietzsche would not understand the "success conditions" for actions in the expressive terms outlined in the previous section. Indeed, it follows naturally from the nonisolatability thesis that a successful action is a type of "normative status" dependent on the agent of that action recognizing herself in it in much the same way that others recognize her. For Nietzsche, then, it appears that the recognitive relations on which determinate actions depend could only be established within particular forms of life or between forms of life whose modes of evaluation are commensurable.
With regard to the relation between action and normativity, then, it is clear that in rejecting the voluntarist conception of agency, Nietzsche rejects the (Christian and slavish) idea that pregiven norms enter in a straightforward fashion into the prior formation of an intention that subsequently causes an action. Nietzsche is, as is well known, a strident critic of morality. However, he does not reject normativity in its entirety. As we have seen, he understands there to be normative constraints operative within different perspectives or forms of life as to what could count as an appropriate act-description or intention-ascription, as well as what could count as a successful action. However, unlike Hegel, Nietzsche does not affirm that there is a further, perspective-transcendent norm demanding the overcoming and final reconciliation of conflicting act-descriptions. In fact, and although this is not a point explored by Pippin, Nietzsche places great value on what we might call "perspectival agonism." Such agonism is, for Nietzsche, a positive phenomenon-indeed, one that ought to be sought out and safeguarded. 40 Nietzsche often affirms "the value of having enemies," which is to say, "worthy enemies" in competition with whom one's own deeds are distinguished or individuated. 41 In the Genealogy, more particularly, Nietzsche stresses the importance of a "pathos of distance" from others for the creation and naming of values. 42 But as he also makes clear elsewhere, this pathos of distance from others makes possible something much more important: a "pathos of self-distancing," which is to say, a striving for continual "self-overcoming." 43 The argument here appears to be that if, as on the expressive account just presented, an agent is "out there" in his deeds and these deeds are "out there" for others, then by seeking out, cultivating, and maintaining nondestructive perspectival conflict with others, an agent keeps forever open the process of the production of the norms on which he understands himself to act and which constitute his character. 44 In this way, following the Nietzschean formulation, the agent is more fully able to "become what he is," namely, an eternally self-creating creature who expressively engineers his own laws of action but who nevertheless does not stand behind his deeds as a "doer" in the causal sense. 45 In short, then, while Nietzsche would reject the Hegelian norms of confession and forgiveness for the overcoming of conflicting act-descriptions, it can be argued that he would replace them with norms aimed at the cultivation and safeguarding of a productive, perspectival agonism.
Deleuze: Becoming Worthy of Our Actions
Turning now to Deleuze, there is a strong argument to be made for there being an expressive account of agency implicit in his 1969 work, The Logic of Sense. 46 Indeed, putting to one side Deleuze's complex relationship to Hegel and Nietzsche, evidence can be found in The Logic of Sense for the two "expressive" theses about action and agency identified above, namely, the inseparability and nonisolatability theses. What is more, despite his rejection of the voluntarist conception of agency and the associated idea of "moral" normativity, there is nevertheless evidence that Deleuze understands there to be normative constraints on act-descriptions and successful actions. As will be seen, however, Deleuze remains much more Nietzschean than Hegelian on the question of what ought to be done about a conflict between first-and third-person perspectives on action.
If we understand the inseparability thesis as the thesis that an agent's intention does not cause her action so much as come to be revealed or expressed in the unfolding of the action itself, then Deleuze affirms a version of this idea. Two points can be noted here. First of all, in the Second Series of The Logic of Sense, and following the Stoics, Deleuze makes a strict ontological distinction between the realm of bodies and causes and the realm of incorporeal events. 47 This division entails that actions, insofar as they are a type of incorporeal event, never belong to the same ontological register as psychological causes or the physical states of brains on which psychological causes are sometimes said to supervene. And insofar as they do not belong to the same ontological register, for Deleuze, actions cannot be said to be caused by intentions or desires or any other kind of psychological cause.
The second and related point is that Deleuze nevertheless continues to speak of "willing the event," particularly in the "Twenty-First Series of the Event." The difficulty here, of course, is that willing the incorporeal action-event cannot be understood as "causing" an action to take place. The argument that needs to be made is thus that an agent's "willing" is not behind an action in the causal sense; it is, rather, inseparable from the incorporeal action-event that expresses it. As Deleuze puts it, the idea of a corporeal or "organic will" must be exchanged for that of a "spiritual will." Moreover, the incorporeal event itself creates in us this spiritual will. 48 We are not the direct causes of action, it seems. The action-as-incorporealevent, rather, reveals something about the agent, such that, as Deleuze puts it, "action is produced by the offspring of the event." 49 In short, then, for Deleuze, we must understand the will, our intentions, and so on to be inseparable from the action-event and to become clear only retrospectively as the action-event unfolds in its own, ideal and incorporeal dimension.
Turning now to the nonisolatability thesis, if we understand this as the idea that an agent's action is not isolatable from how it appears and is interpreted in public space, then Deleuze also affirms a version of this idea in The Logic of Sense, particularly in the Third and Fifth Series. Again, two points can be made in this regard. The first is that, for Deleuze, events in general exist only as expressed or expressible sense. 50 Deleuze's position here is once again derived from the Stoics: bodies are the causes of everything that happens, but what happens-the effect or event-is a propositional item that comes to be true of the bodies denoted by that proposition. 51 The proposition, however, envelops its own internal division. On the one hand, it denotes a body or bodies; on the other hand, it expresses a sense that is, in Frege's terms, the "mode of presentation" of the referent. 52 But the sense expressed by a proposition is not identical with the words used. As Deleuze argues, alluding to Frege's discussion of sense and reference in indirect contexts (ascriptions of propositional attitudes), the sense of a first speaker's declarative sentence, while not identical with the words used, can always be denoted by a second sentence uttered by another speaker. Moreover, since this second speaker's utterance expresses a sense that is not identical with the words used, the sense of the second speaker's utterance can always be taken as the object of a third utterance. The third utterance, in turn, expresses a sense that is not identical with the words used-and so on. 53 Deleuze thus appears to be arguing here that, if a first speaker's declarative sentence expresses a sense that is a mode of presentation of its referent, when a second speaker's sentence takes the sense of the first sentence as its object, it expresses a sense that is a mode of presentation both of the sense of the first speaker's sentence and of the referent of the first speaker's sentence. 54 In The second point to be made about nonisolatability in The Logic of Sense is that, in the "Twentieth Series on the Moral Problem in Stoic Philosophy" and, more particularly, in the "Twenty-First Series of the Event," Deleuze explicitly talks about the "actor" or agent in theatrical terms, that is, as the one who acts before an audience. 55 What is implied by Deleuze's discussion here is that actions-events have a "public" character, which is to say, once again, that they cannot be isolated from their multiple "modes of presentation" in a complex process of sense-making. 56 In short, paraphrasing Pippin, we can say that, for Deleuze, the actor or agent is not so much behind his actions as "out there" in the actions that express his intentions; but these actions are "out there" as well, insofar as they are multiply interpretable by others, which is to say, expressible in perspectivally multiple propositions. Now, these two theses about action and agency-inseparability and nonisolatability-come together in Deleuze's discussion of action in the "Twenty-Ninth Series-Good Intentions Are Inevitably Punished." What also comes to the fore in this series is that Deleuze understands there to be normative constraints on what can count as appropriate act-descriptions, as well as normative conditions for what can count as successful action. Moreover, with regard to what ought to be done about conflicting actdescriptions, we can also perceive in this series a Nietzschean, as opposed to Hegelian, approach.
In the Twenty-Ninth Series, which is couched in a psychoanalytic vocabulary, Deleuze argues that all actions are always-already divided in two. On the one hand, we have the agent's "image of action," that is, an image of what she is purposefully doing. On the other hand, we have the action-event in its nonisolatability from what Lacanians would call the structural-symbolic dimension of language and culture, governed by norms specifying how and what concepts should be applied in making sense of what happens. Deleuze writes: "On one hand, the entire image of action is projected on a physical surface, where it appears as willed . . . ; on the other, the entire result of the action is projected on a metaphysical surface, where the action appears as produced and not willed. . . . The famous mechanism of 'denegation' (that's not what I wanted . . .), with all its importance with respect to the formation of thought, must be interpreted as expressing the passage from one surface to the other." 57 So we have the agent and his imagined intentions, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, we have the production of the sense of that action in a public space and the retrospective attribution of responsibility for that action to the agent. Of course, insofar as the agent and his community agree about the appropriateness of each other's act-descriptions, they can be said to recognize the same conceptual norms. And insofar as both the agent and his community recognize him in an action described in an agreedupon way, the action will have been successful. However, when there is disagreement about what the agent is doing, reciprocal recognition has failed. This situation will, of course, upset the agent's sense of autonomy and create a problem for him-the problem Deleuze captures in the phrase "That's not what I wanted."
But now, with regard to this situation, it can be remarked that Deleuze is in no way concerned with the Hegelian normative obligation to reconcile first-and third-person perspectives on action. Indeed, Deleuze here is much more Nietzschean in his approach, insofar as he views the disparity between perspectives not as a negative moment to be sublated but as a potentially positive phenomenon. As is well known, for Deleuze, just as for Nietzsche, the Hegelian desire to overcome such disparity is a nonnecessary and ultimately "moral" preference for identity over difference, for peace and conformity over struggle and novelty, and so on. For Deleuze, as has just been said, the community's attribution of responsibility to an agent for an action that outstrips what the agent understands herself to intend first and foremost confronts the agent as a problem. It is then a matter for the agent as to how to deal with that problem. The agent could, of course, enter into a process of reciprocal confession and forgiveness with her community, provided the power relations constitutive of the agent's community allow for this type of relationship. Or the agent could treat the disparity between first-and third-person perspectives as involving all kinds of social and conceptual conditions that can themselves be creatively engaged with. To treat the problem in this way is to raise the difference between first-and third-person perspectives on action into what Deleuze calls in the TwentyNinth Series the "crack of thought." 58 Now, throughout The Logic of Sense, Deleuze attributes a number of characteristics to the "crack of thought" that are important to the present argument. First, Deleuze maintains that it is at the "edges" of the crack that events take place, because the crack is a type of "frontier" uniting the two dimensions of bodies and language such that the event appears both as that which is happening in the realm of bodies and that which is expressed in propositions. 59 Second, the crack is able to bring together bodies and sense in this way because it is a relation that is internal to thought. Deleuze explicates this idea initially by speaking of the crack as akin to Kantian inner sense (under the form of time), through which the transcendental thinking I is related to the empirical self, and in such a way that the representations (intuitions) of this empirical self are synthesized and give rise to the self's experience of a temporally coherent world. 60 For Deleuze, however, the crack of thought (which he also calls the "line of Aion") is not something internal to the individual thinking subject. It, rather, marks an impersonal "surface of thought" and is constituted by the division examined above between, on the one hand, the denotation of states of affairs and senses and, on the other hand, the expressed sense-to-be-progressively-determined of these denoting propositions in an intersubjective context. 61 With regard to those events that are actions, then, it is clear that my relation to my action is bound up with my relation to others, as well as with the sense that is made of this action. For the most part, of course, both my proximate others and I understand my intentions-actions in much the same way. However, when others and I do not agree about what it is I am doing, a "crack," which, for Deleuze, was present all along, becomes evident in the form of a difference between what the action is for me and what it is for others. This situation, of course, prevents my action from being successful and upsets my sense of autonomy. The appropriate response, then, is to creatively engage with the social and conceptual conditions that are constitutive of this difference of perspective. And by expressively engaging with these social and conceptual conditions, new self-and collective understandings have the potential to emerge.
But now, further to this point, we can note that Deleuze explicitly recommends adopting a particular practico-normative attitude to the crack of thought. This becomes clear in the "Twenty-Second Series-Porcelain and Volcano." His advice boils down to this: Never let the "truth" of the event on the line of Aion or in the crack of thought be confused with how it is made sense of or actualized at a given moment; always double the actualization with an expressive "counteractualization." In other words, like Nietzsche, Deleuze sees value in keeping open the process of the production of the sense of the events constitutive of one's life. It is in this process, he thinks, that "our greatest freedom lies-the freedom by which we develop and lead the event to its completion and transmutation, and finally become masters of actualizations." 62 Moreover, Deleuze ventures to suggest, it is perhaps "only by means of the crack and at its edges thought occurs, that anything that is good and great in humanity enters and exits." 63 As he puts it, "To be the mime of what effectively occurs, to double the actualization with a counter-actualization, the identification with a distance, like the true actor and dancer, is to give the truth of the event the only chance of not being confused with its inevitable actualization. It is to give to the crack the chance of flying over its own incorporeal surface area . . . ; it is, finally, to give us the chance to go farther than we would have believed possible." 64 By way of conclusion, then, we can say that insofar as Deleuze rejects the voluntarist conception of agency in favor of an expressive one, he also rejects a common approach to the relation between norms and action. Normativity clearly does, however, feature in Deleuze's account of action and agency. It is present at the level of act-descriptions, since the structural-symbolic dimension of language and culture is governed by norms specifying how and what concepts are correct or appropriate to apply in speaking about particular actions. Moreover, Deleuze appears to recognize that a successful action-just insofar as it is successful-is a normative status that depends on an agent and his community recognizing the agent's relation to the action in the same way, which is to say, the action as falling under an agreed-upon description. Finally, Deleuze, like Nietzsche, sees value in treating conflicts between perspectives on action as potentials for creative transformation. We might even consider this a Deleuzean norm that, like the Nietzschean valorization of perspectival agonism, is opposed to the Hegelian norms of confession and forgiveness: "Raise the difference between first-and thirdperson perspectives on action into a 'crack of thought' engaging, and capable of transforming, all kinds of social and conceptual coordinates."
Finally, to bring this discussion full circle by returning to the issue of the moral or ethical dimension of action and agency, it is clear that Deleuze would reject any account of normative ethics that focuses on justifying the claims that already freestanding moral norms are supposed to make on the formation of the ethical agent's intentions prior to the action these intentions are causally related to. But what is Deleuze's positive account of ethics in The Logic of Sense? In a brief and enigmatic passage, he writes that "either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us." 65 What exactly does this mean? It has been my contention that, for Deleuze, what happens to us is ontologically inseparable from the unfolding of an incorporeal event that expresses it and nonisolatable from the expression of the sense of this event in perspectivally multiple and even conflicting propositions. Moreover, it has been my contention that even our actions, since we do not cause them in any direct and transparent way, "happen to us": they are not so much "willed" as "produced" in an intersubjective context. To "become worthy" of our actions-events, then, means to make them our own by engaging with them in their expressivity, which is to say, by expressively engineering in an open-ended process what will be held to have been our intentions-actions. In other words, for the Deleuze of The Logic of Sense, ethics has to do with the expressive "counteractualization" of the actions and other events making up our life history. 66 The norms or principles that will be taken to be the bases of our actions will not be given in advance of our effective and expressive activity. But neither will they be given in isolation from our fellows. They will, rather, be produced in an ongoing way over time and in our often difficult relations with others. 2. Korsgaard summarizes a number of modern philosophy's answers to the normative question in ibid., 18-20. 3. As Korsgaard puts it, the "normative question is a first-person question that arises for the moral agent who must actually do what morality says" (ibid., 16). We should not identify what I am here calling the "voluntarist" conception of agency with what Korsgaard elsewhere calls the "naturalistic conception of agency," according to which an agent's movements are caused or causally guided by his or her own mental states. Indeed, the view that Korsgaard opposes to the naturalistic conception-namely, her own "normative conception of agency," according to which an agent transforms him-or herself into the kind of person capable of causing a particular end by adopting the categorical and hypothetical imperatives-is still "voluntarist" in the sense used in this essay. See Christine M. 8. Ibid., 2; emphasis added. 9. Ibid., 7. 10. Ibid., 10-11. 11. Taylor argues that to say that an agent's intention is expressed is not to say that it is designated. Rather, to say that an agent's intention is expressed in a medium
